A model is developed for two players exerting media manipulation efforts to support each\nof two actors who interact controversially. Early evidence may support one actor, while the full\nevidence emerging later may support the other actor. Exerting effort when the full evidence exceeds\n(falls short off) the early evidence is rewarded (punished) with lower (higher) unit effort cost.\nProperties and simulations are presented to illustrate the playersâ?? strategic challenges when altering\neight model parameters, i.e., a playerâ??s unit effort cost, stake in the interaction, proportionality\nparameter scaling the strength of reward or punishment, time discount parameter, early evidence,\nfull evidence, contest intensity, and evidence ratio intensity. Realizing the logic of the model may\naid understanding on how to handle the difference between early and full evidence of controversies,\nin which players have an ideological stake.
Loading....